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Joseph Schlesinger, begins his groundbreaking book Ambition and
Politics: Political Careers ;n the United States with the idea that political
ambition is important to the study of politics because"ambition lies at the
heart of politics. Politics thrive on the hope of preferment and the drive for
office"(1966: 1).
Many scholars say political ambition, or the drive for higher position
or office, is deeply rooted in Congress and all other areas of American
government. As this is the case, we must take the concept of ambition
seriously, because"by ensuring that eager rivals call each other to
account, it is the primary incentive for public officials to be responsive to
public demands" (Fowler and McClure 1989: xi).
Whiteman (1995: 1) suggests communication is ot the center of a
representative democracy. "The success of Congress as a representative
institution is dependent on the ability of members and staff to maintain
substantial and varied channels of communication... ". Thus, it is
iimportant to study the nature of communication as it has an influence on
public policy. It is also important to study different ambition types, since
ambition can have an effect on communication (Cook 1986).
Despite the voluminous research done in the area of political ambition,
previous investigations have examined the opportunity structure
surrounding a Congressional member's decision to run or have focused
on the distinction between ambitious polit,icians. or higher-office seekers,
and their colleagues who do not exhibit this type of ambition. Also. few
scholars have examined national news coverage and its connection to
congress, Instead scholarly work has largely focused on how congress
members cultivate local news media (see Robinson 1981; Fenno 1982;
Clarke and Evans 1983; and Goldenburg and Traugott 1984). There is also
little academic work on the connection between a House member's
political ambition and his or her relationship with coverage in national
newspapers. This study adds to the sparse research conducted on how
House members' ambition influences their media coverage in national
natiional news papers. This is important because local newspapers tend to
be biased toward their individual representative (Robinson 1981). Also, as
Cook (1.986: 1206) states, "making news and making laws ne-ed not be
incompatible at the national level, and media practices may serve not to
undermine leadershIp within Congress but to reinforce it. H This study
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further tests political ambItion theory and provides evidence that
politicians use the mass medIa to further their ambition.
More specifically, this study examines how political ambition is
expressed through a member's abilities to get legislation passed
(legislative efficiency) and his or her concentration on legislation to a
specific committee (legislative specialization) (Matthews 1960; Hibbing
1991). This study also examines how House members in the 100th
Congress, exhibiting differIng ambition types, have differing Influences on
the nation's two Ilargest and most Influentrol national newspapers - either
directly or indirectly through legislative work.
The hypothesis of this work Is thot political ambition, or the House
member's search for greater internal power or for higher office, affects the
amount and type of coverage a member's receives in nationa.l news
papers, Thus, It is expected that 1) members of Congress who seem to
display progressive ambition (those members who have the ambItion to
seek higher office) are likely to appear more often in national newspapers
than members who show no proglressive ambition; and that 2) members
of Congress who exhibit intrainstitutional ambition (those members who
have the ambition to seek a committee chairmanship or party leadership
post) are likely to appear in the national news less often than members
with progressive ambition. 1 Also, it is hypothesized that; 3) coverage of
members displaying intrainstitutional ambition will concentrate more on
3
legislation; that 4) members eXhibiting intrainstitutional ambition will exhibit
greater legislative spedalization and legislative efficiency, as well as have






Schlesingler (1966) wrote that in politics the relation between motive
and action is more obvious than in most other professions. "Of all those
who perform for their fellow men, the politician leaves the clearest tracks
between his purpose and his behavior. Personal ambition sparks all men's
efforts to do more than subsist" (p., 1). Ambition theory's central
assumption is that a politician's behavior is a response to his/her office
goals (Schlesinger 1966: 10). "Or, to put it another way, the politician as
office seeker engages in political acts and mak,es decisions appropriate
to glalnlnQl office" (p. 6).
Ambition is defined as an "earnest desire for some type of
ac.hievement or distinction; to seek earnestly; aspire to" (Random House
Webster's College Dictionary 1992: 48).
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Political Scientists have identified a total of four career paths for
members of the U.S. House of Representatives: truncated (a single term),
extended serviioe, higher office, and leadership (Barber 1965;
Schlesinger1966; Herrick and Moore 1993). These correspond,
respectively, to Schlesinger's (1966: 10) three categories of ambitions, and
Herrick and Moore's (1993) additional fourth: First, discrete ambition,
means a politician wants an office for only a "specified te'rm" and then
"withdraws from public office." Barber called positions with this ambition
type "Reluctants." Second, static ambition means the politician wants to
"make a long career out of a particular omce." Barber termed legislators
showing this ambitIon type "Spectators." Finally, progressive ambition Is
shown by the public officiol who aspires to gain an office "more Important
than the one he now seeks or is holding." Barber (1965) called these
officials "Advertisers." Herrick and Moore's (1993), additional classification
is IntraInstitutlona:1 ambition. Intrainstitutional ambition Is shown by a
politician that seeks a leadership position, such as a party leadership or
chairmanship within congress.
Legislative aCTIvities of Congressional members may be a function
of their ambition (Schlesinger. 1966; Cook, 1986; Hibbing: 1986). Members
that seem to display progressive ambition are expected to be largely
abov,e average in legislative activity. Since these politicians tend to
harbor the ombiition to run for higher office, they have larger and a more
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varied constituency, and therefore offer more legislation (Schliesinger
1966; Prewitt and Nowlin 1969; Van Der Silk and Pernacciaro 1969; Herrick
and Moore; Moore and Herrick 1995). These members, too, become less
specialized in an attempt to attract a larger-based constituency (Prewitt
and Nowlin 1969; Moore and Herrick 1995). By contrast, a Congress
member that harbors intrainstitutional ambition is more likely to comply to
the Congressional norms. These members are expected to ,Introduce
fewer bills than their progressive counterparts and to be relatively inactive
on the floor as freshmen, complying with what is called the
"apprenticeship norm" (Peabody 1976; Calmes 1987). These Congress
members are well respected since they assume the norm of the legislative
work horse (Matthews, 1960).2
Since the 1970s, though, there has been an increase in the number
of subcommittee chairmanships, which has allowed more members In the
House to move quickly into positions of responsiblltty than ever before. This
Idea of lincreased opportunity is touched upon by a handful of scholars
who consider political ambItion as not the only factor in office seeking,
Rhode (1979) and Schlesinger (1966) say ambition is a constant; House
members enter office with progressive ambition. Rhode, however, also
found that representatives have a better chance of obtaining office from
lightly populated stotes - a function of opportunity, not necessarily
ambition.
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Hibblngl (1993) says If the incumbent has a lot of money on hand
and is from the same party, fewer competitors will run for office against
the salid incumbent. HibbinQl concludes that those who run for higher
office from the House are those that think they have a decent chance to
win. "The decision to run for higher office can be seen as a function of the
desirability of the higher office in question, the odds of successfully
capturing the higher office, and the personal style of the representative
contemplatlnQl the situation" (p. 115).
Hibbing (1993) criticizes Schlesinger's work, saying that he does not
"provide 0 theory of ambition"(p .. 1130). He cites Schlesinger who wrote
that "the central assumption of ombitlon theory is that a politician's
behavior is a response to his office goals"(p. 130). Hibbing says there is a
problem with equating office-seeking behavior exclusively with office
goals. Because if Schlesinger's ambition theory holds, Hibbing argues,
those members with progressive ambition would always run for office, but
this, he says, is not the case, since many of "those running for reelection to
the House would give their eye-teeth for a Senate seat but recognrze they
would lose"(p. 1'30). Accordingly, those members with discrete ambition
retire voluntarily, but some "representatives who are retiring from public
service have not lost all ambition but simply understand that their
electoral situations have become untenable"(p. 130).
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Hibbing suggests that office-seeking behavior is a better mode of
study than merely ambition because it is a more reaHstic measure of a
legislator's goals. Office-seeking behavior is still tainted, though, by many
diverse opportunities facing politicians. Rhode(1979) and
Schlesinger(1960) say oil House members begin with progressive ambitIon,
while Hibbing would suggest that opportunity goes hand in hand with
ambition.
Legisl.ative Specialization and Effectiveness
It is important to examine legislative speclallzafion and effectiveness
(also termed efficiency) because many scholars have made the
connection between ltIese two legislative characteristics and political
ambition theoTIY.
Hibbing (1991) says the measures of legislative specialization and
legIslative effectiveness have been largely ignored by all but a handfull of
scholars until recently. Legislative specialization is defined by Hibbing as
the number of bills referred to the to most frequently Involved commltte.e
by an individuall Congress member - or a member's legislative focus.
Hibbing also defines legislative efficiency as the representative's total bills
reported out of committee and/ or passing the House. Matthews (1960)
introduced the term "legislative speciali1zation," referring to Senate
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members. He asserts in his U.S. Senators and Their World that senators'
higher political ambitions - a desire to become president or vice president
- can I,ead to nonconformity. He soys a senator does not gain a nationaJ
Qudilence by "beingl seen and not heard or through faithful service on the
DistrIct of Columbia Committee" (p. 109). Further. a senator's legislative
duties are often ignored in a quest for publicity and personal
advancement. "His (Senator's) ears are likely to be attuned to noises
outside the work-a-day drone of the senate chamber" (p. 109). Matthews
found presidential aspirants gave more floor speeches than the average
senator and pursued a wider range of legislative interests. This means a
legislator that pursues higher office will not conform to norms and
concomitantly not engage In legislative specialization. On the other
harld. a legislator with any other ambition (it is not specified which type)
will specialize or send legislation to only a f,ew committees. He states that
most senators do specialize due to the sheer amount of legislation, the
many non-Iegislotlve tasks, desire to increase legislative Influence,
specific committee assignments, and numerous constituency interests.
When it comes to legislative effectiveness or the "ability to get one's
bills passed," Matthews (1960) says the narrower a senator's area of
I'egislative interest and activity, the more his effectiveness. Conformity to
Senate folkways does seem to "payoff in concrete legislative results"
(p.115).
10
Hibbing (1991) renames Matthew's effectiveness variable the
"efficiency variable," arguing the term effectiveness ~implies too simple of
a variable. Moore and Thomas (1989; and olso see Hibbing 1991) say in
general patterns of partisanship, the efficiency scores ore higher for
majority-party members than minority-party members. Hibbing (1991),
further, finds that although some scholars state that legislators have
become "iissue-hoppingl dilettante(s)," leglslotors in fact tend to become
more specialized and efficient as time goes on during their respective
Congressional tenures.
The reforms of the 1970s changed the House members' individual
oareers as they have beoame more able toglOin greater influence In
Congress.3 Many schollars found members seeking higher office were
increasing.ly active over time iln floor activity and the number of bills
introduoed (SchIesinger 1966; PrewItt and Nowlin 1969; Van Der Silk and
Pernacciaro 1969; Moore and Herrick 1995). These members, too,
become Iless specialized lin an attempt to appeall to a wider constituency
(SOUle 1969; Prewitt and Nowlin 1969; Moore and Herrick 1995).
Thus, the literature seems to support that congress members tend to
have greater legislative specialization and efficiency (effectiveness) with
greater ambition for leadership or committee chair posts. It Is important to
have a knowledge of political ambition because a legislator's ambition
II
can effect his or her behavior, which influences his or her activities, In turn,




THE NATIONAL MEDIA AND CONGRESS
Scholars seem to agree that members do pay more attention to the
mass media more than ever before, many stili disagree though as to the
member's mass media focus - national or local.
Cook (1986) found the institutionalization of House press secretaries
attests to congressional members increased focus on the mass media.
Kedrowski (1996) says House members hove traditionally criticized
ineffective legislators as "show horses" talented at creatIng sharp sound
bites. Today, increasing.ly numbers of members enjoy and even court
reporters to make statements. Kedrowski further says greater numbers of
this "new breed of legislator" have turned to media cultivation, thus
bUilding national reputations without the benefit of a chairmanship or
party-leadership position. In sum, Kedrowski finds that members use the
mass media to influence the policy process in Washington and/or to seek
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higher office, "but the public is not irrelevant. "(p ..5). The more salient an
issue, the more the members themselves will read about the issue and the
more likely they are to respond (King:don 1981). Cook contends that
members of Congress are still ihighly concerned about local coverage.
Hess (1986: 6) seems to agree since he found that more than 70 percent of
House press secretaries, responding to his survey, sold they "would rather
get (coverage for my employer) in the front page of my hometown daily
any day than the New York Times or the Washington Post',
It is important to look at the mass media-congress connection
because political sci:entists have traditionally assumed House members
gained an advantage in the reelection process through attention in
national media (see Robinson 1981; Payne 1980), Hess (1991) contends
that most press efforts made by members of Congress are designed to
publicize the members' activities in their district. Hess also mentions that
newspaper opinion-editorials are an Important opportunity to reach the
Washington community, He says most news is targeted at the legislative
district's constituency. However, only a few actively pursue efforts to gain
national coverage (Kedrowski 1996)
Kedrowski explains further that some legislators are more attuned in
regards to the powerful effects and usefulness of mass media. These
legislators are called media entrepreneurs, whose immediate goal is to
influence the public debate on an issue facing the public agenda and/or
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the legisl'ative process. "It is designed to reach a small audience of public
officials and att-entive publics that follow an issue and its legislative
progress" (p. 6). For example, Les Aspin CD-Wisconsin), who as the
Chairman of the House Armed Services Commmee, was successful in
gaining media coverage (Cook 1989). Aspin said the purpose of his
media efforts were to catch the eyes of the "serious followers of the
sUbject ... who read the Times and the Post. .. You're trying to influence
the debate on the sUbject. You're trying to anttcipate where the story is
going, but you're also trying to push a story a certain way" (Evans 1981 :
28-29). Squire (1988) says senators notice when issues receive an
abundance at media attention. These legislators are conscious of the
media attention they attain, and this In effect may influence the manner
in which they execute their legislative work. Cook (1987) says congress
members value the national media for two reasons: creating national
constituencies for an issue, and the position given the national
spokesmanship. He found these two goals only marginally significant in
predicting or finding a relationship with progressive ambition.
The presentation of media has a distinct influence on polley makers.
Cook et al. (1983) found that legislators who were exposed to the media
about an issue were more likely to change their views about the Issue
compared to legislators not exposed to that same issue. The media can
shape the views and the conduct of legislators and the public's vi-ews
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about the governm;ent. So congressmen are sensi,five to the media
because it can affect their futures as legislators (Graber 1993; Katz 1993).
Graber (1993) says the media help senators because their use ,gives
them an opportunity to voice their opinions on issues and,llence, gain
public support. Support is also important from fellow legislators to pass
legislation (Cook 1989). Davis (1992) states that the media can also serve
as a vehicle to kill legislation. The media can strengthen members'
advantages since the media promotes their behavior and interests on the
issues (Graber 1993).
Legislators use the media to keep informed about the world inside
and out of Washington D.C. (Matthews 1960). The most frequent
Congressional coverage in Washington Is that of committee action
(Robinson and Appel 1979). MacKuen and Coombs (1981; Shaw and
McCombs 1977) say the elite press is the most accessible to the leglslotor.
The Congressional member's target audience is most likely small, highly
educated politically efficacious, and geographically located in the
Washington D.C. area. This audience is most likely to learn about public
issues through the media. This group's opinions on the doily pUblic Issues
are likely shaped by editorials and the amount of coverage an issue
receives.
There is a two-way causal effect between the media and Congress
members. In other words, each can influence the othe-r (Graber 1986).
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Matthews says, on one hand', reporters need stories and. on the other,
Individual legislator needs to secure his or her reelection. So, It would:
follow that progressive ambition is partly manifested and fostered in an
increased desire for media coverage.
Leadership in the House and the national press
Hibbing (1991) says formal positions, "whether they are party
positions or committee positions, go a long way toward defining the
career of a representative" (p. 62). Much of the discussion on
congressional leadership has centered on area of gaining formal
positions. Bullock and Loomis (1985) say in earlier Congresses, progression
to quality formol positions was relatively slow but that in more recent
Congresses advancement has come more quickly. Hibbing (1991)
suggests this may be because of the larger number of formal positions
after 1969 than before this period of time.
What is important, here, is the fact that some positions in the House
ore opt to gain more media attention than others. Peabody (1976) says
the typical House member "is seldom asked to appear on the weekly
televised talk shows, 'Meet the Press,' 'Face the Nation,' and similar
network presentations. Such invitations usually are reserved for House
leaders" (p. 44). Thus, many members do not gain much mass media
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attention at all. Cook (1986: 207) supports Peabody as he states: "In short,
if there is a buHt-in bios In news coverage of Congress, it need not be
toward "mediagenic" show horses but toward members In official roles
within the congressional hi,erarchy-for example, party leaders or
committee chairs."
Some members, who are called work horses (also lntralnstltutional')
obtain media attention through their bUlly pulpit and credibility to
comment on issues. Cook (1989; Hess 1986) say party leaders as well as
committee chairmen have this abi:lity. Miller (1978) says committee chairs
often dramatize their meetings to gain media coverage marketability.
Scholars have traditionally termed "work horses" those members
that tend to legislation (Matthew 1960; Mayhew 1974; Payne 1980; Cook
1986; Langbein and Sigl~eman 1989; Kedrowski 1996). These work horses
are essentially the same as members that exhibit intrainstitutional ambition
(Herrick and Moore 1993). Members that exhibit Intrainstltutional ambition
tend to introduce more legislation; they are more actfve on the floor, and
are more specialized.
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The Speakership and media
Peabody (1976) finds that the Speaker and the m~norJty leader serve
as their respecti,ve Congressional parties' principal legislative strategists
and prime external spokesmen.
Peabody, though, sees that the media have little Impact on
Congress. He says newspaper columns and editorials, magazine articles,
and television commentaries are" rather fleeting and fragmentary in their
impact" (p. 495). He says, further, Congress members are bombarded
with the media and largely ignore it on the eve of a vote. Thus, he says,
the media only leads to "reinforcement of existing preferences," rather
than altered preferences.
Yet scholars like Davis (1992) say the media are a powerful
influence. He states that it is a possible strategy to build coalitions
between leglslatiors through media use. These legislators wHi use sources
such as the Washington Post, in hopes to "move colleagues to action" (p.
169). Kedrowski (1996) would agree with Davis as she says that leaders do
calculatingly use the media to their advantage. For example, House
Speaker Rep. Newt Gingrich (R- G,eorgia) has gained a great deal of
media attention since his rise to a leadership position. Kedrowski classifies
the elite press as: the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, and the
19
Washington Post. A Congress member who goins coverage in this elite
press, he or she gains some prestige in Washington circ:les, she says.
It is important to note in this chapter that it Is important to
understand that the member's focus on national media attention is
different than if they focused on the local medIa. It is important also to
note that members with leadership positions within the House have






THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE NATIONAL MEDIA 'AND POLITICAL
AMBITION THEORY
Schlesinger (1966) offers a connection between the media and
political ambition as he says: "With respect to elective offices, our
ambitious politician must act today in terms of the electorate of the office
which he hopes to win tomorrow" (1966: 10), Matthews made this
connection a few years earlier, In his examination of the mass media's
ability to reach voters, but his duty was complet,ed without the benefit of
ambition theory. Matthews (1960: 94) says there are two types of
Congress members: the "show horses, "and "work horses." He says: "If
you want to get your name in the papers, be a show horse. If you want to
gain the respect of your colleagues, keep quiet and be a work horse"
(p.94). Work horses work behind the scenes to get their legislative Jobs
done, while show horses try at every opportunity to become recognized
(Langbein and Sigelman 1989; Payne 1980). Ornstein et 01. (1985: 31) say
21
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that senators, who sHek higher office attract notional media attention, and
that they (the senators) "tailor their behavior accordingly, , .. emphasizing
media coverage over legislative craftmansh~p.u Mayhew (1974: 147)
wrote: "The hero of the- HIli is not the hero of the airwaves. The member
who earns prestige among his peers is the lonely gnome who passes up
news conferences. , . in order to devote hIs time to legislative
'homework.'u However, some political scientists say Gresham's law of
legislative behavior, which, says television has driven out the work horses in
favor of more telegenic show horses (Easterbrook 1984), might ring true,
Wolfstein (1985) however, contends show horses dominated long before
tel.evislon as these Ie-gislators neglected all but a few legislative causes to
showcase themselves. Other political scientists say the media, instead,
focus on work horses since they produce the most legislation. Hess (1986:
6) says, "Those who do the work get most of the publicity."
Veblen (1981) says politicians that gain the most meda attention
are Uberal Democrats and the House Leadership. Other schotars agree
with Veblen but add that such politicians are the most ambitious and
anxious to influence the policy proce-ss (Hinkley 1988; Ehrenhalt 1991),
Members that exhibit progressive ambit~on seem to fit the show
horse mentality as these legislators that are more inclined to be active on
the floor. There, they can establish a record of concern and gain the
media attention they need (Schlesinger 1966: Prewitt and Nowling 1969:
22
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Thus. the literature review supports the thesis' four hypotheses,
suggesting the following:: 1) members who exhibit progressive ambition. or
are higher-office seekers, should receive more coverag;e in national
newspapers than those members without this type of ambition; 2) those
who exhibit intrainstitulonal ambition (seeking a chairmanship or other
leadership in the House), will gain less coverage than members who
exhibit progressive ambi,tion; and that members who are legislatively
specialized and efficient, will gain more national coverage than members
who are not. Further, 3)members who exhibit intrainstitutlonal ambition will
concentrate on legislation. Also, 4)members who exhibit intrainstltutional
ambition should exhibit greater legislative specialization and legislative





This thesis examines the relationships between progressive and
intrainstitutlonaJ ambition and the number of times Congressional
members were mentioned in both the New York Times and The
Washington Post.4 This stUdy measures the representatives that served in
the 100th Congress. This Congress was chosen because this study can
attempt to measure a member's ambition over the sUbsequent eight
years. This study uses linear regression to examine the independent
variables of progressive and intrainstltutional ambition.5 There are six
variables to measure the dependent variables for media coverage. First
newspaper coveroge, the dependent variable, is measured by the
number of times a member was mentioned in both the newspapers'
indexes between January 1987 to December 1989. Second, this study
also counts the number of times an article is based on legislation. These
simple criteria determined by basic news content will, hypothetically,
measure a House member's influence on the mass media through
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legislative work instead of relying primarily on the other types of stories
that a member might not have as much control over because of outside
influences. The third through sixth variables examine placement. Each
news article is coded as to whether it was on the front-page, In the first
section,6 letter to the editor or column, or articles placed In other parts of
the news paper. The total tabulated number of news stories is also
recorded.? Letters to the editor are accounted for since Hess (1991)
suggests that members found them important. The Washington Post Is
considered an important tool in research (Robinson and Clancy 1983) as is
the Congressional Quarterly (Hess 1986: 111). The New York Times also
seems to be an Important variable to consider. Counting the number of
articles pertaining to legislation is unique in scholarly literature, but it seems
important since many articles are based on other factors, such as regional
differences, popularity, scandal, election coverage, and others. This
researcher's focus is limited exclusively to national newspapers. Further
research could enhance this current study with an in-depth examination
of local newspapers nationwide.
The effects of other characteristics are controlled to insure that the
variables are well specified -- committee prestige, the liberal and
conservative interest-group ratings, race, gender, and time in office are
only utilized from the lOath CongJess data. These control variables are
used because they may actually influence the mass medio as much or
26
even more than the independent variables under measurement in this
study.8 Control variables willl,ead some credibiUty to the results by possibly
eliminating or pinpointing other influences on the mass media other than
a House member's political ambition.
Committee presti,ge is considered since some comm,ittees - for
instance, the Ways and Means, Rules, Budget, and Appropriations -- may
gain more national exposure (Squire 1988). These committee assignments
are coded 2, while Energy and Commerce are coded 1, and all others O.
This wiH help discern which members are on prestige committees or not. It
might be expected that members on prestige committees will receive
greater news coverage. Oth,er controls are the ADA's score, which
evaluates a member's liberal votes, while the ACU's score assesses a
member's conservative votes (Ehrenhalt 1987). Only the ADA's score is
used since the ACU's score is analogous to the ADA's. Both measures,
taken together, g'lve a good control measure of political ideology. Veblen
(1981) found liberals In the House and Senate gdned more national press
coverage. Also, Hibbing (1991) says party leadership is most likely to come
from ideological moderates. Hess (1986) suggests that party is important
to consider since the majority party may have greater news coverage.
Members of the 100th Congress had a Democratic majority, so Democrats
are coded 1 and RepUblicans O. Herrick and Moore (1993) say the two
ore differentiated since the Republicans may harbor higher office goals.
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Race and gender are coded 1 when the members' status is female
or minority, while all others are coded O. Since there are fewer minority
and women members in the House, these legl510tors might net gre.ater
coverage than their white-male counterparts. These measures are used
since a majority of House members are white males. Theoretically, it might
take more politicol ambition for a minority member or female to become
a party leader committee chair in the House than it woulCi for a white
male. Time in offioe is measured since HIbbing (1991) found senIority is
related to aspects of legislative behavior. Also, coverage of a minority,
especial.ly a minority female may faU under the news value of uniqueness
or novelty, thus, more news worthiness.
A dummy variable Is used for members from New York, who tend to
gain more news coverage in the New York Times because of proximity.
Members from New York are coded 11 , while members not from that state
are coded O. A dummy variable is also used for members from either
Virginia or Maryland because it is expected the Washington Post will also
embrace the news value of proximity.
This thesis, additionally, considers the scholarship of Hibbing's (1991)
article, which examines five measures of legislative actlvity; this thesis
examines three of the five measures, which may be precursors to media
coveragie. These measures of legislative activity are important because
they moy be precursors to media coverage, thus, an increase in anyone
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type of legislative activity may mean greater media attention. The first IS
the number of legislative bills a member sponsors. The Congressional
Index arllows for the separation of ~he primary sponsor from the mass of
cosponsors that often sign themselves up on a bill in today's Congress.9
The next two measures "attempt to tap more than raw activity levels"
(Hibbing 1991: 416). The second measure is called legislative
specialization, which is a dependent variable, computed 'through dividing
bills referred to the most frequently involved committee by the total
number of the representative's bills. The third measure is efficiency and Is
also a dependent varioble. This measure considers the percentage of the
representative's total bills reported out of committee and/or passing the
House during the 100th Congress. Cosponsored bills, private bills and
resolutions are ignored. Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin (1990) say the fact
that more senior members are more active than junior members In
offering bills seems to tolerate standardization for the large fluctuations in
bill introduction. At the same time, Rohde (1988) and Schneier (1988) say
this relationship has changed because of the deterioration of the
apprenticeship norm.
The independent variab~esare divided between the
intrainstitutional and the progressive ambition types, Members who
exhibjt party leadersh:ip have attained a leadership position as either a
speaker, majority leader, majority whip, deputy whip, caucus chair, or a
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member of the steering and policy comml1tee (Hibbing 1991). These
positions are coded 1 if the member had attained a party leadership
position in the 100th Congress 0, if not. Another variable measures
leadership positions in the 101 st through l05th Congress', members with a
leadership position are coded 1, others are coded O. Scholars such as
Rhode (1978) contend that Congress members ,exhibit political ambition
from the time they enter office, so it is important to identitY these members
that actually obtain leadership positions later in their careers and examine
the news coverage they gained prior, in this case, in the 100th Congress.
This thesis divides the independent variable of the political ambition
variable further. House members that exhibit intrainstltutlonal ambftlon are
divided between party leaders and committee chairs (Van Der Silk and
Pernacciaro 1979). These authors found a difference In the two types of
internal, office-se,eklng positIons; they say the chairmanship "constitutes a
distinct opportunity structure separate from and often rival to the party
floor leadership" (p. 222). Therefore, it is important to keep the two
intrainstitutionalleadership types separate. Members who attained a
committee chairmanship or a committee minority leadership in either the
100th Congress to today were coded 1, while those members that did not
attain either of these positions were coded O.
Schlesinger's (1966) progressive ombltlon is utilized in this thesis to
measure those members who sought either a governorship or senatorship
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in the 1Doth Congress to the present Members who sought a. either a
governorship or senatorship were coded 1, while those members that did
not seek either office were coded O. Progressive ambition Is an
independent variable. This measure might have a weaker significance
since Rhode (1988); Ornstein, Peabody, and Rohde (1989); and Hibbing.
(1991) would say the apprenticeship norm no longer exists. Thus, these
scholars contend that seniori1y in recent congresses is not as important
today as it was In previous congresses.
It was necessary to separate the two intralnstitutional ambitlon
variables - party le·adership and committee chairmanship - between
those that held positions in the lOath Congress from those members that
held office in the 101 sf to the 105th Congress. Some members held
positions in both the 10Qth Congress and those Congresses thereafter. It is
important to determine if a member's ambl,tion during the lOath Congress.
has a relationship with media coverage separate flfOm his or her position
holding or perceived ambition during the future Congresses.
This analysis only includes 340 of the 435 House members because
of exclusions. This thesis controls for what Hess (1986: 86) calls "originals,"
by excluding them from the anOl'lysis. Originals are basically politicians
that, regar,dless of personality type, tend to seek or are sought out for
more than average news coverage. Members that had excessive media
coverage about activities outside what is expected for a Congress
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member., For example, Fred Grandy, the representative from, who starred
as "Gopher" on "The Love Boat" gained medi.a coverage exclusively
about his acting career. Other exclusions are freshmen, non-voting
members, those who died before the end of the 1Doth Congress, and
outliers. 10 Forty-nine freshmen in the 100th Congress lack information in the
categories of legislation, articles, and ideological score, thus, these
members would not benefit this analysis. The five non-voting members
called the "shadow" members are excluded because they are not
exactly members of the House. 11 The remaining members gained too
much coverage. Some ran for president in 1988, while others were
involved in various scandals. For example, former House Speaker Jim
Wright received royalty payments of more than 50 percent from his book,
Reflections ofA Public Man, which was a rate far higher than usual (New
York Times Index 1988). Wright received more than 30 artlcles on this
scandal alone. Another example Is the publicity arising from allegations
that Georgia Representative Patrick Swindall negotiated for nearly $1





The findings for legislative activiity were lacking and contradict this
thesis' third and fourth hypotheses. These findings are important to
determine what effects legislative activity have on a member's national
news coverage during while in Congress.
Neither Table I nor Table II supports this thesis' hypothesis that
members who exhibit political ambition, either progressively or
intrainstitutionally, are more legislatively spedalized or efficient. The
dependent variable of legislative effectiveness (efffciency) reveals
significance only with prestige committee membership in the looth
Congress and the total number of bills introduced. Meanwhile, the
dependent variable of legislative specialization only seems to signIficantly
affect the total number of bills introduced.
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The same significant relationships are found when both leadership
variables - committee chairmanship and party leadership - are separated
between members' positions held in the lOOth Congress and tbose who
held memberships in Congress between and including the lOlst and the
l05th •
The findings for both legislative specialization and efficiency seem
to contradict this thesis' third and fourth hypothses. It was.expected that
members displaying intrOiinsfiitutional ambition would also exhibit greater
legislative specialization and efficiency and also gain more media
coverage. The findings did not find a significant relationship between




The findings are nearly opposite the first !fwo hypotheses presented
in the thesis. This theses suggests that progressive members do not gain as
much coverage as members with intrainstitutional ambition. It is
ilmportant to discover If a member's ambition will effect his or her media
coverage. This thesis suggests this Is onty true for party leaders during the
100th Congress.
Table III, which describes polltlical ambition's effect 011 total news
coverage, reveals some significant relationships. The most important is
that House members, wh.o were party leaders anytime between the 100th
and 1o5th Congresses, have a signlficant relationship with the dependent
variable of total news coverage, or the number of times they were
mentioned in eIther the New York Times or fhe Wash;ngton Post during the
lOOth Congress. Other independent variables with significant relationships
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when examining total new coverage were: proximity (if a member's
residence was in ,either New York, VIrginia, or Maryland} party (coded 1
for Democrat and 0 for Republican), race (coded 1 for white and 0 for
minorities), and the number of terms served by the 1OOth Congress.
Table IV takes out the leadership variable to examine if there was a
correlation between the independent variables of party leadership and
committee chairmanship. Table IV revea~s that the committee chair
variable stili does not reach significance with the party leadership variable
taken out.
Table V examines polItical ambition's affect on page-one stories.
This table reveals a highly significant relationship between page-one
stories and the independent variable of party leadership. Other significant
relationships between the table's independent variables and the
dependent variable of page-one stories include: If whether a member
was a majority leader in the 1OOth Congress, his or her party, membership
in a prestige committee, and the number of terms a member was in
congress.
Table VI examines politicall ambition's effect on first-section stories.
This table also finds a highly significant relationship between House
members who served as party leaders and the dependent variable of
first-section stories. Other significant relationships are those of prOXimity,
party, race, and number of terms served..
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The dependent variabl,e for articles that mention legislation, In Table
ViiI, only reveal 0 significant relationship with prestige in the lOath Congress,
race, and the number of terms a representative is in office. 12
Table X once again ,exomines total news coverage as the
dependent variable. The difference be1ween this table and table til is
that each independent variable for leadership - committee chairmanship
and porty leadership - are separated into two different vqriables. One
variable denotes members holding positions in the loOth Congress and the
other applies to those who he~ld positions :in those Congresses between the
loath and the 105th .13 This examination of member's leadership separated
between the lOath Congress and future congresses is also true for table Xl
through table X:V. This procedure examines whether current pos~fion­
holding or future position-holding reveals a significant relatlonshlp with the
total number of times a member was mentioned in national newspapers.
A significant relationship is revealed with the independent variables of
committee chairmanship and party leader. Other variables that reached
significance are: membership In prestige committees for the 100th
Congress, party, race, and the proximity variables.
Table XI examines if there is a correlation between the findings for
political ambition in the 1DOth Congress and total news coverage when
the latter congresses ore taken out.
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Table, XII, examines total news coverage when the Independent
variables for intrainstitutional ambition for the loath Congress are taken out,
significant relationships are not evidenced in the independent variables
for intranstltutional ambition in those congresses after the lOath.
Table XIII reveals that the dependent variable for poge one news is
significant with party leadership in the lOOth Congress and the number of
terms a member has been in office.
Table XIV exhibits a significant relationship between the dependent
variiOble of news coverage in parts of the paper other than [n the first
section. This dependent variable has a significant relationship with
members who are chairs in the lOOth Congress, proximity and race -- while
only nearing significance with the party variable. News coverage in this
variable is negatively related to prestige committee membership.
Table XV reveals the dependent variable for news coverage in the
fiirst section is signiJicanf with committee chairmanships and party
leadership in the lOoth Congress, race, and the proximity variable.
In sum, five of the six dependent varIables examined for media in
this thesis -- total news coveroge, page-one stories, first-section stories,
sections other than the first, legislative stories, and legislatively-based
stories -- reveal significant results in each of the analyses examined. Only
the independent variab:le for editorials and columns did not reveal
significant results. Linear regression is used to examine if any of the
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dependent variables for media coverage are significantly related to
politicol ambition or any of the control variables.
These findings seem contrary to the fIrst hypothesis that House
members reveaUng progressive ambition willgoin more coverage than all
other ambition types. Furthermore, these findings do not support the
second hypothesis that House members who exhibit introinstitutional
ambition wilil likely appear in national newspapers less than members who
exhibit progressive ambition. However, House members with
intrainstitutionall ambiltion (more specifIcally, a party leadership during the




At first blush, this thesis' findings seem to support Schlesinger's (l966:
10) words: "Wi,th respect to el-ectlve offices, our ambitious politician must
act today in terms of the electorate of the office which he hopes to win
tomorrow" (p. 10). A significant rel,ationship between members who
gained party leadership positions and total news coverage is found on first
inspection of the results of this thesis and seems to confirm Schlesinger's
connection between congressional members' current mass media
coverage and political ambition in future Congresses.
Conversely, this thesis also suggests Schlesinger's connection
may not hold true. The varIables for committee chairs and party
leadership between members who gained leadership and committee
chair positions in the lOOth Congress were separated from their
counterparts in the 101 st through the l05th Congresses. This procedure was
performed to discover whether members disp~ayingcurrent ambition
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(ambition in the 100th Congress) and ambition in future Congresses (101 sf
through the 105th) have differing influences on the dependent variables.
The findings suggest that intralnstiJutionol ambition (more specifically
party leadership) in the 100th Congress does significantly relate to greater
coverage in national newspapers in that same Congress. On the other
hand this thesis finds the relationship between national coverage In the
looth Congress and the variable for party leadership exhibited in future
Congresses Is not significant. The other Intrainstitutional variable
(committee chairmanship) does not reveal significant results at all. ThIs
might seem to make sense considering that members do choose to climb
the party leadership ladder but are appointed to a chairmanship. This
finding seems to support Van Der Silk and Pernacciaro's (1979) rationale,
which suggests the two Intrainstitutional variables -- House party leaderhip
positions and committee chairmanship positions -- have different
opportunity structures. Thus, these relationships might result from the fact
that it takes ambition to gain a leadership post, but it only tokes seniority to
gain a committe,e chairmanship.
This thesis also suggests that House members exhibiting
intrainstitutional ambition receive greater national newspaper coverage
than their fellow progressive lawmakers, regardless of their I,egislative
activity. This might be explained by Kedrowski's (1996) findings. She says
members that want to influence their fellow legislators use the natIonal
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media, whereas members seeking state-wide office seek the local media.
Thi,s is probably why members who sought national office did not net more
coverage than party leaders. Progressive members sought more local
coverage.
This is contrary to much of the literature contending that the
workhorses Of progressively ambitious members gain more mass media
attention than members exhibiting other sorts of ambitions (see Matthews
1960; Mayhew 1974; Easterbrook 1984). Instead, these findings might
reinforce what some scholars say: the advent of N news and floor
coverage has blurred the old distinction between workhorses (progressive
ambition) and show horses (intrainstitutional ambition) and the old
divisions are no longer true (Cook 1986; Langbien and Sigelman 1989).
Also, these findings allude to Hess' (1986: 6) statement that: "Those who do
the work get most of the pUblicity."
Although this study's results seems to support Hess' assumption that
workhorses get the most publicity through their introduction and passing of
legislation, this might not hold true. Instead, it might be that these
members are trying, as Kedrowski (1996) suggests, to actively court media
attention to influence policy. Therefore, it might be true that it Is more
important for House members to try to pass legislation than to actually
pass it. Plus, as Cook (1989; Hess 1986) say, it helps that committee
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members and party leaders have a bully pulpit and a I,evel of credlbUity to
comment on issues in the search for mass media attention.
This thesis' findings support Kedrowski's idea that House members
work hard to gain mass media coverage. Also, these findings might
suggest that it does not matter whaJ a House member's legislative activity
consists of if he or she does not gain coverage. This might be why this
study found that the dependent variables of legislative efficiency and
specialization did not have signifiicant results.
These findings also contradict Hess' (1986) assumption that It Is those
members who do the most work indeed receive the greatest publicity.
Conversely, it seems it's the legislator's greaJer agenda-setting abillties in
pursuit of influencing policy and their credible position that gets the
greatest national newspaper attention.
Hibbing (1993) would say that if political ambition theory holds true,
members wilth progressive ambition will run for office, but that this is not
always the case, as many members in the House would "give their eye-
te,eth for a Senate seat" but realize that they would not win (p. 130), This
thesis seems to suggest Hibbing's theory regarding opportunity might hold
true, too, with members who seem to exhibit intrainsJitutional ambition,
Meanwhile, those members who seem to exhibit discrete ambition, by
Schlesinger's definiHon, are retiring, not out of lacking political ambition for
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higher office, but because they have simply come to the realization that
they cannot reach that office.
Also, this thesis supports Cook's (1986) findings that suggest
leadership and seniority impacted visibility in the New York nmes because
individuals with such characteristics have the credibility and the bully




Political ambition theory seems to lack an ingredient in examining
the legislative behavior of Congress members and their connection with
national newspapers - opportunity. A House member can exhibit a strong
sense of ambition, but if he or she does not have the opportunity to
ascend to the next level, the member's ambition type might in the end
amount to little and become an irrelevant factor.
Additionally, choice might have some bearing in measuring
ambition. The structure of Congress might create barriers for some
members to gain a party leadership position, which could cause a
member to try to position himself or herself to gaIn national coverage.
However, some legislators are appointed as a comm'ittee chairs without
being given a choice. The former le'gislators must try to seek media
coverage since they choose to seek the position, whereas the latter do
not need to seek media attention since there is no choice involved. This
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might help explain why party leaders gain more national newspaper
attentiion than commi1tee chairs.
It also seems that work horses, or members with the Intralnstitutlonal
ambitlon (as a party leader) who climb the Internal ladder of the
chamber, tend to gain more media coverage if they, themselves,
currently have some kind of leadership posit:ion, this is supported by Cook
(1986). A member with a position of credibility seems to gain more mass
media attention than someone with political ambition and no position.
This might seem obvious because journalists with less time these days have
to seek credible sources quickly without seeking alternative lawmakers.
What's less obvious is that political ambition theory lacks the aspect of
opportunity, not only in gOiinlng positlons but media exposure.
Pollitical ambition theorists must incorporate a methodology that
includes all the mass media outlets: television, broadcast. and advertising.
Plus, it is important to exomine local as well as natlonal coverage
simultaneously because progressive members are more apt to seek local
coverage for a state-wide election. tt seems scho~ars must combine
political ambition theory and opportunity to gain greater insight into
legislative behavior.
Therefore, this study suggests that Schlesinger's often quoted
conjecture that an "ambitious politician must act today in terms of
electorate of the office which he hopes to win tomorrow" is no longer the
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case at least when is comes to national newspapers. National news-
paper coverage is not an indicator of future position holding or ambition.
Finally, in today's world of immediacy, position- and office-seekers must
act today to gain national news paper coverage today.
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*= significant at .05; * = significant at .01
Note: First, is the t1llstandard regression coefficients: in parenthesis are Ihe standard errors.
R2 = .973; N = 31]
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TABLE II















































*= significant at .05; .. = significant at .01
Note: Firs!, is the unstandacd regression coefficients; in parenthesis are the standard errors.
R2 =.492; N = 311
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TABLE III












Party leader lOoth to the
lOSlh
IntrainstitutionaJ Ambition



























"= significant at .05; • =significant at .01
Note: First, is the unslandard regression coefficients; in parenthesis are the standard errors; and in the brackets are the slandardized
regression coefficients. R2 = .225; N =311
55
TABLE IV
Political Ambition's Effect on Total News Coverage





































*= significant at .05; * =significant at .01
Note; First. is the unstandard regression coefficients; in parenthesis are the standard errors; and in the brackels are the standardized














































*= significant at .05; ~ = significant at .OJ
Note: First. is the Ilnstandacd regression coefficients; in parenthesis are the standard errors.
R2 =.095; N =3t1
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TABLE VI













































"= significant at .05; .. =significoot at .0 I
Note: First, is !he unstll:l1dard regression coefficients; in parenthesis are the standard errors.
R2 =.209; N =311.
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TABLE VII


















































*= significant at .. OS; • = significant at .01
Note: First, is the unstandard regression coefficients; in parenthesi,s are the standard errors.
R2 = .207; N =31 I.
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TABLE VIII
Political Ambition's Effect on Legislative Effectiveness With
the Party Leadership and Committee Chair Variables in the 100th


























































"= signifi.cant at .05; .. =significant at .01
Note: First, is lhe unstafldard regression coefficients; in parenthesis are the standard errors. R2 =.973; N =31 L
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TABLE IX
Political Ambition's Effect on Legislative Specialization With the Party
Leadership and Committee Chairs Variables of the 100th Congress



























































*::0 significam at .05; .. ::0 significant at .01
Note: First. is the unstandard regression coefficients; ill parenthesis are the slaildard errors.
R2 ::0 .492; N ::0 311
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TABLE X
Political Ambition's Effect on Total News Coverage With the Party




















































*= signi.ficant at .05~ * = significant at J)I
Note: First, is the uoslandard regress.ion coefficients; in parenthesis are the standard errors; and in the brackets are the standardized
regression coefficienls. R2 = .257 ; N = 311.
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TABLE XI
Political Ambition's Effect on Total News Coverage
Without Committee Chair and Leadership Variables from the 101 st








































..= significant at .05; .. = significant at .OJ
Note: Firs'\' is the IInstandard regression coefficients; in parentllesis are the standard errors; and in tile brackets are the stal1dardized
regression coefficients. R2 =.257; N = 311
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TABLE XII
Political Ambition's Effect on Total News Coverage
Without Committee Chair and Leadership Variables








































*= significant at .05; ,. = significanl at .01
Note: First, is the unstandard regression coefficients; in paren.thesis are the sUlndard ecrors; and in the brackets are the siandardized
regression coefficients. R2 = .211; N = 311
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TABLE XIII


















































*= significant at .05; * = significant at .01




Political Ambition's Effect on Articles























































*= significanlat .05; * = significalilal .01
Note: First., is the unstallclard r.egression coefficients; in parenthesis are the standard errol'S.



























































"= significant at .05; " =significant al .0 I
Note: First., is the unslalldard. regression coefficiellls; in parenthesis are the standard errors.




1. House members who exllibit progressive ambition strive for either a senatorship or a
governorship. A members who exhibit intrainstltutional amb~ton strive for a position within
the U.S. House of Representatives as a party leader or a committee chair.
2. Conversely, scholars have questioned the existence of an apprenticeship norm
(Rhode 1988; Ornstein, Peabody. and Rohde 1989; Hibbing 1991 ). Ornstein et al. (1989)
say that a junior Democratic senator once stated, "... We're all equals so you should act
accordinglyU(p. 20). There is further contentlon among scholars as to how norms are even
measured (SChneier 1988 and Rohde 1988). The disagreement centers on three
methodologies of whether a norm can be detected by asking people involved of its
existence. observation of member's behaviors as to Its existence. or whether certain
behaviors are related to reputation, sanction. or rewards within Congress.
3. The reforms of the 19705 is argued to have Increased the opportunity for freshmen
members to glOin leadership. become less specialized. and increased floor activity (?).
4. Using th,e New York Times and Washington Post Indexes. House members were
indexed between Jan. 1987 to Dec. 1989 were counted for the total number of times
each member was mentioned in an article in either of the aforementioned newspapers.
Only national newspapers are examined because of the researchers lack of resources.
Additionailly. there are legitimate reasons to explore the national media. For one.
Kedrowski (1996) found that House members use the national media in order gain
salience for an issue and to influence their fellow members.
5. Regression is used to estimate the value of a variable Y corresponding to a given
value of a variable x. X is the dependent variable and Y is the Independent variable. In
this case. regression is used to examine the correlation between the dependent variable
and the entire set of Independent variables.
6. In the case of the Washington Post. this means section A; in the case of the New York
Times this means section I.
7. The total number of times a House member was mentioned In either the New York
Times or the Washington Post during the 1DOth Congress.
8. control variables in this thesis - race. gender. ADA scores. it a majority leader.
proximity. if on a prestige committee, term number. and total legislation - help determine
if the relationship between 1he independent variables and dependent variables
examined have a spurious relationship.
9. Congressional Index lists primary and secondary sponsors of a bill and its referring
committee. The 100th Congresses bills were examined. which numbered 1650.
10. Outliers were House members wi,th excessive media coverage because of scandal,
running for office. and previous fame. For example. Richard Gephordt (D-Mo.). who ran
for president. had more than 100 stories between the two national newspapers
examined.
11. Shadow members are members that "are not exactly members" of the House. They
have all the privedges of members. but can not vote. They are members from Puerto




12. Table for Ambition's affect on legislation for the separated illtraills11tutional variables
were not added because the same relationships were found. Meanwhile, the
dependent variable for editorial and opinion columns was 1I0t included because no
significant relatlonshlps were found.
13. Each intrains11tutlonal independent variable - party leadership and committee
chairmanship - were divi:ded between members who held either of these posi11ons in the
1DOth and those members who held positions in any of the Congresses between the 101 st
and the 105th .. Thjls was to determine whether current position-holding or future position-
holding reveals a significant re:I'atlonship with fhe dependent variables examined.
14. The ACU's score, measunlng ~he member's conservative ideological scores were
taken out since they are nearly opposite the ADA's score, which. measures liberal votes,
and since both scores were not needed, the ACU's score was taken out. Future research
might look at local newspaper and television coverage of House members to gain
greater insight on the connection between the a member's ambition coverage and
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